The

Freedom Renaissance Project

White Paper

Rethinking the Property Tax

Ownership, regressivity, and a county-level path to reform — the academic case, with sources and the strongest counterarguments.

Dawn breaking over open prairie and a small homestead
Evidence,
not just argument

A White Paper of The Freedom Renaissance ProjectNovember 2026~6,000 words · 21 references

Abstract

The ad valorem property tax is the largest own-source revenue of American local government, yet it is the only major tax that is levied on an asset whether or not that asset produces income, and the only one routinely enforced by sale of the taxpayer’s home. This paper examines the property tax on four grounds: its distributional burden (it takes a larger share of income from low-income and older households), its base (largely unrealized, illiquid wealth), its enforcement (tax-sale foreclosure, which the U.S. Supreme Court limited in Tyler v. Hennepin County in 2023), and the disclosure gap between local budgets and audited Annual Comprehensive Financial Reports. Using California’s Proposition 13 and Mello-Roos districts as a case study, it argues that infrastructure should be financed by time-limited, debt-specific levies, and that general operating costs should migrate to less coercive revenue sources. It then proposes a deliberately small-scale test: concentrating civically engaged residents in a low-population, low-tax county where local officials set the levy, to demonstrate that property-tax elimination is fiscally and politically achievable. The paper closes with the strongest counterarguments, including the benefit-tax view of local finance and the 2024 defeat of North Dakota’s statewide abolition measure.

1. Introduction

For most American households the property tax is the second-largest housing cost after the mortgage, and for retirees who own their homes outright it is often the largest. It is also the single most important local revenue source: in 2022 property taxes supplied 28.9 percent of local general revenue, second only to state aid (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy).

The author’s interest in the question is practical. A career in mortgage banking and real estate brokerage involves handling property tax bills daily, and a family experience made the burden concrete: in his father’s final years, annual property taxes of roughly $10,000 consumed about 40 percent of a Social Security income near $26,000. Cases like this are not typical, but they are not rare either, and they reveal how a tax designed around property values can lose touch with a household’s ability to pay.

This paper asks three questions:

  1. On what principles, if any, can a recurring tax on owned property be justified once the infrastructure it originally financed has been paid for?
  2. How does the property tax compare with income and sales taxes on fairness, liquidity, and severity of enforcement?
  3. Is elimination achievable in practice, and where would a first demonstration most plausibly succeed?

2. Background: How the Property Tax Works

2.1 Origins

The property tax is older than the Republic. Colonial and early state governments taxed land, livestock and polls in varied ways; as late as 1796 only four of fifteen states taxed the mass of property by valuation (EH.net). During the nineteenth century the states adopted the “General Property Tax,” a comprehensive levy on land, buildings, personal and even financial property. After the 1930s it was largely displaced by income and sales taxes and narrowed into today’s tax on real estate (Dray, Landais and Stantcheva, NBER). In short, the modern property tax is the remnant of an explicit American wealth tax.

2.2 Mechanics

A bill is the product of an assessed value and a tax rate, summed across every overlapping jurisdiction: county, city, school district and special districts. In most states the assessed value tracks market value and is revised periodically, so the tax rises with home prices even when the owner’s income does not.

2.3 Case study: California’s Proposition 13

California voters approved Proposition 13 in 1978. It rolled assessments back to 1975 levels, capped the general levy at 1 percent of assessed value plus whatever rate is needed for voter-approved bonded debt, and limited annual assessment growth to 2 percent or inflation, whichever is lower, until the property is sold or newly built (San Luis Obispo County Assessor; Legislative Analyst’s Office). Before Proposition 13 the average California rate was 2.67 percent, and property tax payments fell about 60 percent immediately afterward (LAO). The voter-approved debt rates are why many California bills land near 1.1 to 1.25 percent rather than exactly 1 percent.

Proposition 13 was a response to a real hardship: long-time owners whose homes had appreciated several times over faced bills tied to values they had never realized, and some were forced to sell. It solved that problem for incumbents by tying the tax to acquisition price, at the cost of very different bills for neighbors in identical homes.

2.4 Mello-Roos: a debt-specific model

Proposition 13 left new subdivisions without an obvious way to pay for schools, roads, water and public-safety buildings. The Mello-Roos Community Facilities Act of 1982 filled the gap. It lets a local agency form a district that issues bonds for named facilities and repays them through a special tax on property inside the district, with two-thirds approval of voters or, where few voters live, landowners (San Diego County Assessor).

Mello-Roos has a property this paper treats as a design principle: it is tied to specific assets and, for facilities financing, typically ends when the bonds are retired. The general 1 percent levy has no such end date. A homeowner in a newer San Diego community may pay roughly 0.6 percent of value in Mello-Roos for the facilities that serve them, on top of a general levy about twice as large that continues indefinitely. That contrast raises the question this paper pursues: once the buildings are paid for, what exactly is the perpetual levy buying, and who decided it should never end?

3. The Case Against the Property Tax

3.1 It is regressive

Because home values are a much larger multiple of income for low-income families than for the wealthy, residential property taxes take a larger share of poorer households’ income. The Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (ITEP) found the poorest fifth of taxpayers paid 4.2 percent of income in property taxes, against 3.0 percent for the middle fifth and about 1.7 percent for the wealthiest (ITEP, 2019). ITEP, which generally favors progressive taxation, reaches the same conclusion this paper does on this point: the tax is disconnected from ability to pay (ITEP).

The burden is sharpest for older owners. In Health and Retirement Study data, 10 percent of homeowners aged 50 to 75 paid 9 percent or more of their income in property taxes, and for a quarter of those the annual bill was at least 40 percent of their household financial assets (Federal Reserve, FEDS 2008-51). Housing-rich, income-poor retirees are exactly the group least able to absorb a bill that rises with the market.

3.2 It taxes unrealized, illiquid wealth

Proposals to tax unrealized capital gains on stocks or cryptocurrency draw sharp objections: the gain is on paper, it may reverse, and the owner may have to sell part of the asset to pay. Each objection applies with more force to a market-value property tax:

3.3 It is enforced more harshly than any other tax

Income-tax debts are collected under a statute of limitations and with negotiated relief. The IRS generally has ten years from assessment to collect, after which the debt expires (IRS); taxpayers can request installment agreements or an offer in compromise. The IRS’s own powers are not gentle: a wage levy is not capped at a flat percentage and takes everything above an exempt amount set by filing status and dependents (Taxpayer Advocate Service). But federal law shields a taxpayer’s principal residence from IRS levy absent written supervisory approval and a court order, and bars levy on residences entirely for debts of $5,000 or less (26 U.S.C. § 6334).

Property-tax debt has none of these protections in most states. It is a lien on the home itself, it does not expire, and it is typically resolved by selling the home. In California, a residence becomes subject to the tax collector’s power to sell after five years of default (State Controller’s Office). Until 2023, Minnesota and about thirteen other states went further and kept the entire sale price, including the owner’s equity above the debt. Geraldine Tyler, then 94, owed about $15,000 in taxes, penalties and costs; Hennepin County sold her condominium for $40,000 and kept the $25,000 surplus. A unanimous Supreme Court held that this was an unconstitutional taking: the county could sell the home to recover what was owed, but could not use the debt as a toehold to confiscate more (SCOTUSblog). Tyler returned the surplus; it did not change the underlying remedy of losing the home.

3.4 It conflicts with the meaning of ownership

A recurring tax for the privilege of keeping what one already owns, bought with income that was already taxed, sits uneasily with the American idea of ownership. If the tax goes unpaid, the government can take and sell the property. Functionally, then, the owner holds title subject to an annual rent payable to the state.

Critics of the property tax often point to Marx and Engels, whose first proposed measure in the Communist Manifesto was the abolition of property in land and the application of all rents of land to public purposes. The comparison should be drawn carefully: the Manifesto called for abolishing private land ownership, not for a property tax, and the most famous American advocate of land taxation, Henry George, explicitly rejected state ownership of land (Progress.org). The narrower and more defensible point is this: the more of a property’s annual value the state claims, the more ownership comes to resemble tenancy.

4. What Local Government Finances Actually Show

The public debate over property taxes is conducted almost entirely in terms of the annual budget: what was collected, what was spent, and the size of next year’s gap. That frame is incomplete. Every state and most cities and counties also publish an audited Annual Comprehensive Financial Report (ACFR), known before 2021 as the Comprehensive Annual Financial Report or CAFR; the Governmental Accounting Standards Board changed the name in Statement No. 98 without changing the content (Deloitte summary of GASB 98). An ACFR must be audited by an independent auditor and contains introductory, financial and statistical sections (Texas Comptroller).

Where a budget is a spending plan for the coming year, the ACFR is a balance sheet and income statement for the year just ended. It reports what a government owns (land, buildings, investment portfolios, cash reserves, enterprise funds), what it owes (bonds, pension and retiree-health obligations), and its interest and investment income. These are the documents that rating agencies and bond buyers read before lending.

The author’s experience is that a government can report a budget shortfall while its ACFR shows substantial reserves, income-producing assets and growing land holdings. A fair reading must also acknowledge what ACFRs reveal on the other side of the ledger: much of a government’s net position is locked in roads and buildings that cannot be sold, many reserves are legally restricted, and unfunded pension liabilities are often large. The policy point is not that local governments are secretly rich. It is that taxpayers deserve the whole picture before being told a tax increase is unavoidable.

Recommendation. Any county considering a tax change should publish a one-page plain-language summary of its ACFR alongside the budget, showing unrestricted reserves, investment income, non-essential real estate, and long-term liabilities. This disclosure costs little and is a precondition for an honest debate about replacing the property tax.

5. Policy Alternatives

Elimination is only credible if the services the tax pays for are either funded another way or found to be unnecessary. The options below range from relief within the current system to full replacement.

Option How it works Strengths Weaknesses
Sunset levies (the Mello-Roos model) Each capital project carries its own levy that ends when its bonds are paid Ties tax to a named asset; ends automatically Leaves operating costs unfunded
Local sales or lodging taxes Shift general revenue to transactions Voluntary in timing; visitors share the cost Also regressive; volatile in downturns
Fees for services Charge directly for trash, water, permits Users pay for what they use Limited to services with clear users
Federal Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILT) Federal compensation for untaxable federal land; $733 million to over 1,900 local governments in 2026 (NACo) Large relative to budgets in public-land counties Set by Congress; depends on federal acreage
Circuit breakers Credit when the tax exceeds a share of income; offered by 18 states and D.C. in 2019 (ITEP) Targets the households most burdened Relief, not elimination; requires paperwork
Deferral and freezes Seniors postpone taxes as a lien until sale, or lock in a base-year bill Keeps retirees in their homes Debt accrues against heirs’ inheritance
Larger homestead exemptions Exempt a fixed slice of a primary residence’s value Simple; politically popular Narrows the base and shifts burden to other property

The most ambitious current example is Florida’s Amendment 3, on the November 3, 2026 ballot. It would raise the non-school homestead exemption to $250,000 by 2028 and direct the legislature toward eventually eliminating non-school homestead taxes. The Tax Foundation has criticized it for lacking a replacement plan and for shifting burdens in distortionary ways (Tax Foundation). Whatever its outcome, it shows that elimination of the homestead property tax has moved from the fringe into mainstream state politics.

This paper’s preferred sequence is: (1) require plain-language ACFR disclosure; (2) convert all new capital financing to sunset levies; (3) replace the general operating levy with a mix of fees, voluntary local sales or lodging taxes, and existing federal and state transfers; and (4) protect current owners during the transition with a circuit breaker so no household is foreclosed while reform is phased in.

6. A County-Level Demonstration Strategy

6.1 Why the county

Statewide abolition requires persuading millions of voters, most of whom fear losing local services. A county is different. In many rural states the county commission, typically three to five elected members, sets the county’s share of the levy, and in a county without incorporated cities it is the dominant local government. A few hundred committed voters can decide a commission seat in a county of under 2,000 people.

6.2 Selection criteria

The project has identified a candidate county using the following criteria, and is withholding its name until enough participants have registered to protect the effort from speculative land buying and premature opposition:

6.3 Precedent: the Free State Project

The closest precedent is the Free State Project, which since 2001 has encouraged liberty-minded Americans to move to New Hampshire. By its own count more than 6,200 participants had moved by 2024, and between roughly 20 and 40 have served in the state House at any time. The project also offers a caution. In Grafton, New Hampshire, a smaller effort to concentrate libertarian residents in one town cut the municipal budget sharply in the 2000s; journalist Matthew Hongoltz-Hetling’s A Libertarian Walks Into a Bear (2020) documented deteriorating roads and services and conflict with wildlife. Any credible plan must show that essential services continue.

Citizens have a constitutional right to move between states and to vote where they reside; the Supreme Court struck down long durational residency requirements for voting in Dunn v. Blumstein (1972) (Justia). The right is tied to genuine domicile, however. Participants must actually live in the county as their principal residence, and registering to vote at a property one does not occupy can be a crime. The strategy depends on real residents, not paper ones.

6.5 Fiscal design

Before any vote, the project should publish a model county budget built from the county’s own ACFR: current levy revenue, PILT and state transfers, reserves, fees, and mandated services (sheriff, courts, roads, elections, records). The model must show how each mandated service is funded after the operating levy is phased out. School taxes, which are usually set by a separate district and often by state formula, should be treated as a distinct and later question.

7. Counterarguments

A serious proposal must answer its strongest critics. Five objections deserve direct treatment.

The benefit-tax view. Many public-finance economists defend the property tax as the best local tax available. Because its base cannot move, it is stable and hard to evade, and because good schools and services raise home values, owners in effect pay for benefits they receive. William Fischel’s “homevoter hypothesis” holds that this link makes homeowners careful monitors of local spending. On this view, abolishing the tax would weaken local accountability, not strengthen it.

Voters have rejected abolition. In November 2024, North Dakota voters defeated Measure 4, which would have eliminated most property taxes and required the state to replace local revenue, by roughly 63 to 37 percent (Ballotpedia). Opponents warned that replacement costs would fall on the state budget and on other taxes. This paper’s response is that a statewide vote is the hardest possible test; a county demonstration lets voters see results before being asked to adopt them elsewhere.

Services will suffer. The Grafton experience (Section 6.3) shows what happens when budgets are cut without a plan. The answer is the fiscal model required in Section 6.5: no levy should be repealed until replacement funding for each mandated service is identified.

The burden simply shifts. Replacement revenue must come from somewhere. Local sales taxes are also regressive, and higher fees can hit the same retirees this paper aims to protect. Eliminating the tax on homesteads alone, as Florida’s Amendment 3 proposes, can shift costs to renters and businesses.

Capitalization and windfalls. Economists expect a permanent tax cut to be capitalized into land prices: if the tax disappears, homes become more valuable. Current owners gain a windfall, while future buyers pay higher prices in place of the tax. In a small county this could price out the very newcomers the strategy depends on. Phasing reform in gradually, and favoring owner-occupants, would moderate the effect.

None of these objections defeats the proposal, but each sets a condition it must meet: transparency, a balanced replacement budget, protection for low-income households, and an honest accounting of who gains and who pays.

8. Conclusion

The property tax persists less because it is defended on its merits than because it is familiar, stable, and deeply woven into local finance. Yet it is regressive for the households least able to pay, it taxes illiquid wealth that the owner has not realized, and it alone among major taxes is routinely enforced by taking the home. California’s own Mello-Roos districts show a better principle: tax a defined group for a defined asset, and stop when it is paid for.

The Freedom Renaissance Project proposes to test that principle where it can be tested fairly: in one small county, with full financial disclosure, a balanced replacement budget, and residents who have genuinely made it their home. If it works, it offers a model others can examine and adapt. If it fails, it will fail at a scale where the lessons are cheap. Either way, the debate over whether Americans can truly own their homes deserves evidence, not just argument.

How to participate. Readers who want to follow or join the effort can register here. Registrants will receive the county’s identity once the participation threshold is reached, along with the model budget described in Section 6.5.

References

  1. Ballotpedia. “North Dakota Measure 4, Prohibit Property Taxes Initiative (2024).”
  2. California Legislative Analyst’s Office. “Common Claims About Proposition 13.” 2016. https://lao.ca.gov/Publications/Report/3497
  3. California State Controller’s Office. “Tax-Defaulted Property Public Auction.” https://sco.ca.gov/ardtax_public_auction.html
  4. Deloitte. “GASB Statement No. 98, The Annual Comprehensive Financial Report.” 2021.
  5. Dray, S., C. Landais, and S. Stantcheva. “Wealth and Property Taxation in the United States.” NBER Working Paper 31080, 2023. https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w31080/w31080.pdf
  6. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/405/330/
  7. EH.net. “History of Property Taxes in the United States.” https://eh.net/encyclopedia/history-of-property-taxes-in-the-united-states/
  8. Federal Reserve Board. Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2008-51, property taxes and older homeowners.
  9. Fischel, W. A. The Homevoter Hypothesis. Harvard University Press, 2001.
  10. Hongoltz-Hetling, M. A Libertarian Walks Into a Bear. PublicAffairs, 2020.
  11. Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy. “Property Tax Circuit Breakers in 2019.” https://itep.org/property-tax-circuit-breakers-2019/
  12. Internal Revenue Service. “Time IRS Can Collect Tax.” https://www.irs.gov/filing/time-irs-can-collect-tax
  13. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. “Significant Features of the Property Tax.” https://www.lincolninst.edu/
  14. Marx, K., and F. Engels. Manifesto of the Communist Party. 1848.
  15. National Association of Counties. “Department of the Interior Announces Distribution of $733 Million in PILT.” 2026.
  16. San Diego County Assessor/Recorder/County Clerk. “Mello-Roos.” https://sdarcc.gov/content/arcc/home/divisions/assessor/mello-roos.html
  17. San Luis Obispo County Assessor. “History and Impact of Proposition 13.”
  18. Tax Foundation. “Florida Property Tax Proposal.” https://taxfoundation.org/blog/florida-property-tax-proposal/
  19. Taxpayer Advocate Service. “Levies.” https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/get-help/interacting-with-the-irs/levies
  20. Tyler v. Hennepin County, 598 U.S. 631 (2023).
  21. 26 U.S.C. § 6334, Property Exempt from Levy. https://www.govinfo.gov/link/uscode/26/6334